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ESSAYS
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
ACQUIESCENCE(?)
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK*
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a unique institution
within the federal judiciary. It is the only intermediate appellate court with
nationwide jurisdiction over particular subject matter. Only the Supreme
Court has the same geographic scope. Of particular importance is its appellate
jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws. It is also unique that, given
its patent expertise, it oversees an expert agency, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). This Essay explores the relationship of the Federal
Circuit vis-à-vis the Supreme Court and the USPTO over three periods of time. It
first explores the early years of the court’s existence where, in light of the Supreme
Court’s absence from the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit generally
ignored—if not overruled—Supreme Court precedent. Also during this period of
time, the Federal Circuit generally refused to defer to the USPTO in a manner
inconsistent with administrative law principles. The second period of time was
one of transition: The Supreme Court began to reengage with patent law,
generating resistance from the Federal Circuit. Similarly, Supreme Court cases
and legislative developments began to shift power in patent law away from the
Federal Circuit and toward the USPTO. The third and final era is one of
acquiescence to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and deference to the
USPTO. However, two pending en banc cases may portend the end of this era
of acquiescence, hence the question mark in this Essay’s title.

* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. My thanks to the American
University Law Review for allowing me to participate in this tremendous and
important annual event. Thanks to Lucas Osborn, for comments on an earlier draft
of this article, and Zach Stevenson, for helpful and timely research assistance. ©
2016 Timothy R. Holbrook.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is unique in the
federal judiciary. It is the only permanent intermediate appellate
court with national jurisdiction based on particular subject matter.1

1. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 653 (2002). Congress has,
at times, created temporary courts with national jurisdiction over particular subject
matter areas. For example, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals (TECA) to deal with issues arising from the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, which “authorized the President to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries, and
to establish priorities for use and allocation of petroleum products.” Tex. Am. Oil
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). TECA
dealt with particular issues, though, and not cases. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838 n.3 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 820–21 n.1 (1988) (Stevens,
J., concurring)). It was staffed with current Article III judges on a part-time basis. See
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA.
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It was created by merging two existing courts—the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the Court of Claims.2 Unlike other
courts, it was also charged with a particular mission by Congress: to
bring uniformity to the nation’s patent laws.3 The regional circuits
had created such a tangle of doctrine, with some circuits being rather
hostile to patents, that forum shopping was rampant.4 By centralizing
expertise at the appellate level, Congress hoped to reduce such
shopping, generate a uniform body of patent law, and enhance the
value of patents within the United States.5
The Federal Circuit is uniquely situated. Though inferior to the
Supreme Court, it nevertheless also has national jurisdiction in
patent law.6 It seemingly has expertise in patent law in a way that the
generalist Supreme Court does not.7 When coupled with the
Supreme Court’s inattention to patent law prior to, and immediately
following, the court’s creation, the Federal Circuit appeared in its
early years to be the “de facto supreme court of patents.”8
The Federal Circuit also has appellate jurisdiction over an expert
agency, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).9
Normally, when a court reviews administrative agency decisions, the
appellate court is a generalist court with no particular expertise.10
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit effectively has
expertise in administrative law, but the court does not have specific

L. REV. 1111, 1111–12 (1990). Ultimately, TECA’s jurisdiction was transferred to the
Federal Circuit. See Tex. Am. Oil Corp., 44 F.3d at 1561.
2. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63
AM. U. L. REV. 961, 975 (2014).
3. Alan D. Lourie, Foreword, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 764 (2016).
4. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (2003) (describing the
problems with regional circuit review of patent law).
5. See id. at 261 (stating that Congress aimed to “promote certainty” in patent
cases (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981))); R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115–16 (2004).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
7. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (describing the Federal Circuit as “a sustained
experiment in specialization”).
8. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 387, 387; see also Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41
AM. U. L. REV. 577, 577–79 (1992) (highlighting the court’s internal review
procedures as a reason for the Supreme Court’s minimal involvement).
9. See § 1295(a)(4)(A).
10. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 1, at 1111.
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expertise in any particular regulatory area.11 In contrast, the Federal
Circuit shares an area of substantive expertise with the USPTO.12
Indeed, one of the Federal Circuit’s predecessors, the CCPA, had
appellate jurisdiction over the USPTO.13 As such, early in its
creation, the Federal Circuit and the USPTO often had “turf wars”
over what deference was owed to the Agency.14
More recently, however, these dynamics appear to have shifted.
The Supreme Court has reengaged with patent law, and, after an
initial period of resistance, the Federal Circuit increasingly is
following the Court’s precedent with little pushback.15 Additionally,
after some Supreme Court intervention and the passage of the LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA),16 the Federal Circuit has begun
treating the USPTO with greater deference in a manner akin to how
most appellate courts review administrative agencies.17
This Essay explores the transformation of the Federal Circuit and
its recent acquiescence to both the Supreme Court and the USPTO.
It offers some explanations for this transformation and then looks to
the pending en banc decisions in In re Aqua Products, Inc.18 and Wi-Fi
One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.19 to foresee whether such post-AIA
deference will continue.
I.

THE EARLY YEARS: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AS THE SUPREME COURT
OF PATENT LAW

Congress created the Federal Circuit after years of study and
debate over how to create uniformity in certain areas of law and to
reduce the federal courts’ overloaded docket.20 Some viewed this

11. Id. at 1123. See generally John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553
(2010) (discussing the D.C. Circuit as a quasi-specialized court and comparing it to
the Federal Circuit).
12. See § 1295(a)(4).
13. See Cotropia, supra note 4, at 259.
14. See discussion infra Section I.B.
15. See discussion infra Section III.A.
16. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
17. See discussion infra Section III.B.
18. 833 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam).
19. Nos. 2015-1944, 2015-1945, 2015-1946, 2017 WL 957224, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan.
4, 2017) (per curiam).
20. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 1114 (describing the Federal
Circuit as a “calculated institutional design refined over two decades”); see also History
of the Federal Judiciary, Landmark Judicial Legislation: Federal Circuit Act 1982, FED. JUD.
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new appellate entity as an experiment with expert courts.21 As such,
the Federal Circuit was a bit of an oddball at its creation. It thus had
a challenge before it: It needed to take the unruly patent doctrine of
other courts and attempt to create some uniformity in the law. But it
had to do so while reviewing the judgments of district courts that
were utterly unfamiliar with this new court way off in Washington,
D.C. In other words, the Federal Circuit had to demonstrate its
legitimacy to the district courts and perhaps to other institutions.22
At times, the enterprise did not appear to go well.23 Nevertheless, the
atmosphere surrounding the court’s creation may offer some
explanation for the two dynamics this Part discusses: the Federal
Circuit willfully ignoring Supreme Court precedent with which it
disagreed and the Federal Circuit’s refusal to defer to the USPTO.
Ultimately, the court appeared to be aggrandizing power over the
patent system at the intermediate appellate level.
A. The Federal Circuit Cleans up Patent Law—and Ignores (Overturns?)
Supreme Court Precedent
When the Federal Circuit was created, it had a monumental task on
its hands: creating uniformity from the morass of patent case law
developed by the regional circuits.24 The law varied widely from
circuit to circuit, which was part of the reason for creating the
Federal Circuit.25 Implicit in such circuit variation is the reality that
the Supreme Court was not terribly engaged in patent law and let

CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html (last visited
Apr. 28, 2017).
21. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7.
22. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 973, 986–87 (2015) (examining the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy in
the patent space vis-à-vis its interactions with the Federal Circuit).
23. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) (“[The patent case] goes to the Federal
Circuit afterwards. You know, it’s hard to deal with things that are ultimately
resolved by people wearing propeller hats.” (quoting O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No.
95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996))).
24. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 651 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting “the divergence among the federal
circuits in their interpretation of patent issues” as partly “provid[ing] support for the
congressional decision in 1982 to consolidate appellate jurisdiction of patent appeals
in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”).
25. Id.
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these differences develop and fester.26 In that regard, the Supreme
Court was partly at fault for the disarrayed state of patent law.27
From this perspective, the Federal Circuit’s assertion of itself as the
“supreme court of patent law” is unsurprising. The court faced a
daunting task of assimilating the disparate doctrines into a uniform
body of law.28 It also had to earn respect and legitimacy in the eyes of
the district courts.29 The court therefore needed to take clear and
fairly aggressive positions vis-à-vis patent law.
Given the legitimacy concern, it also makes sense that the Supreme
Court remained absent during the Federal Circuit’s early years. If the
Supreme Court had intervened frequently, particularly on matters of
substantive patent law, then the new court may have looked weak and
inferior to its peers. The Supreme Court’s hands-off approach allowed
the Federal Circuit to mature and to consolidate various doctrines.
And hands-off the Supreme Court was. The Court rarely took patent
cases.30 When it did, they typically involved procedural or constitutional
law issues.31 The Court infrequently addressed core patent law
doctrines.32 In one of the rare cases during this period in which the
Supreme Court did review substantive patent law, the Court criticized

26. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275 (2002) (“[The Supreme Court] seemed to lose
interest in the field at mid-century, and the Court’s patent docket precipitously
declined. For the next three decades, the Court averaged barely one patent decision
per year . . . .”); Janis, supra note 8, at 391 (noting that providing discretionary review
of patent cases to the Supreme Court meant “the Court’s involvement in routine
patent matters ceased”).
27. Duffy, supra note 26, at 276 (“The Federal Circuit was created in part because
of the Supreme Court’s then decades-long neglect of the field . . . .”).
28. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary, 527 U.S. at 651; Dreyfuss, supra note 7.
29. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 26–27.
31. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6 & n.30 (2003). The
Supreme Court did address the doctrine of equivalents on the merits in WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., considering both the all-elements rule and
prosecution history estoppel. 520 U.S. 17, 24, 29–30, 40–41 (1997). It appears to
me, however, that the Court was partially duped, thinking that the case implicated
Seventh Amendment jury trial rights. Id. at 37 (“The various opinions below,
respondents, and amici devote considerable attention to whether application of the
doctrine of equivalents is a task for the judge or for the jury.”). The Court ultimately
declined to answer that question. Id. at 38.
32. See Holbrook, supra note 31, at 6.
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the Federal Circuit (now ironically) for offering too little certainty
regarding the substantive standard for the on-sale bar to patentability.33
The Federal Circuit took advantage of the Supreme Court’s
abdication of judicial supremacy in patent law. The court quickly
began to clarify the law, even if, at times, its decisions seemed to
conflict with earlier Supreme Court precedent. For example, the
Federal Circuit jettisoned the concept of “combination patents.”34 It
discarded the doctrine that an invention is obvious under 35 U.S.C. §
103 if it was “obvious to try.”35 It elevated the importance of the
secondary indicia of non-obviousness, noting that a court must
consider these factors if in evidence.36 The court dramatically
33. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1998) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s multi-factor test determining the trigger for the on-sale bar to patentability). But
see Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Implications
of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the on-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 933, 933 (2000) (asserting that the Court’s test in Pfaff had little effect on the
law because the lower courts’ application of it diverged significantly).
34. See, e.g., Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587, 593 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (reiterating that the Federal Circuit does not adhere to the premise that
non-obviousness is difficult to find in combination patents and “if it was obvious to
try combining elements, the combination itself must be obvious”); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding no statutory
distinction between combination patents and other types of patents, and that
classification of combination patents confuses the law). But see Sakraida v. Ag Pro,
Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976) (“Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims
with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in
an assembly of old elements.” (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950))).
35. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (pointing to “obvious to try” as the incorrect obviousness standard but noting
the hotly contested debate over the issue); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (“‘Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute obviousness.”); Milliken,
739 F.2d at 593; Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]reating
the advantage as the invention disregards the statutory requirement that the
invention be viewed ‘as a whole,’ ignores the problem-recognition element, and
injects an improper ‘obvious to try’ consideration.”). But see Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282
(reasoning that the reordering of old system elements may have produced “more
striking results,” but those results were still the product of the old elements
functioning in the same manner as before). The concept of obviousness compares a
patent-hopeful invention with current patented inventions to ensure that the
processes, the functions, and the technology are readily distinguishable by a person
with ordinary skills in the area that the patent-hopeful invention seeks to enter.
Daniel A. Tysver, Patent Requirements, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/patent/requi
rements.html#nonobvious (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
36. Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1574 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (“[T]he trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider the
evidence of secondary considerations . . . .”). But see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
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expanded what constituted patentable subject matter.37 And it made it
easier for patent applicants to demonstrate an invention’s utility,
seemingly in tension with the Supreme Court precedent on the issue.38
B. The Federal Circuit Asserts Its Dominion over the USPTO
When Congress created the Federal Circuit, the court inherited the
CCPA’s jurisdiction over the USPTO’s patent validity and
interference determinations.39 The initial judges on the Federal
Circuit were the judges of both the CCPA and the Court of Claims.40
As such, the CCPA judges brought with them their previous
experience with the USPTO.

U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (“Such secondary considerations . . . might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be
patented.” (emphasis added)). A district court highlighted this shift:
[T]he Supreme Court [in Graham] noted that secondary considerations
“may be relevant in particular cases.” [Graham, 383 U.S. at 18]. Teva argues,
based on this language, that consideration of such evidence is discretionary,
not mandatory. The Federal Circuit, however, has clearly instructed that
secondary considerations must be considered in every case in which they are
present. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, Inc.,
807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986). “Arguably, the Federal Circuit has more
eagerly employed [secondary considerations] than th[e] Supreme Court
language [in Graham] would suggest.” ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 163 (2d ed.). This Court is bound by the Federal
Circuit precedent unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it.
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 n.1 (D.N.J. 2006)
(third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original).
37. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60, 960 n.19 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc); see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[A]s this
court has recently held, virtually anything is patentable.” (citing State St. Bank, 149
F.3d 1368)). See generally John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40
B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1159 (1999) (“This aberrant reinterpretation of Diehr and
Chakrabarty does a disservice to the many Federal Circuit opinions that have applied
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in patent eligibility determinations.”).
38. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding tumor models
sufficient for utility). But see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966)
(requiring “specific benefit [that] exists in currently available form”).
39. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1125.
40. See History of the Federal Judiciary: U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2017); see also Jim Davis, Formation of the Federal Circuit, 11 FED. CIR. B.J.
547, 548 (2002) (mentioning multiple judges from the Court of Claims that moved
over to the Federal Circuit).
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The CCPA, much like the current Federal Circuit, was an expert
Article III court overseeing an expert agency.41 Moreover, the CCPA
always sat en banc, which meant that its earlier decisions were not
binding precedent.42 Instead, the court was only bound by stare
decisis.43 As a result, the CCPA would, on occasion, change its law after
a fairly short period of time.44 The CCPA also had a contentious
relationship with the USPTO. For example, the CCPA and the USPTO
wrestled with the definition of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a dispute
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in favor of the USPTO.45
Given this history, it is somewhat unsurprising that the Federal
Circuit, early in its existence, similarly refused to treat the USPTO as
a typical agency.46 The Federal Circuit embraced its own role in
supervising substantive patent law, particularly given that the USPTO
had no substantive rulemaking authority.47 In some ways, it was as if
41. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1131 n.98 (explaining that Congress enacted
legislation in 1956 designating the CCPA as an Article III court).
42. Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
43. Deckers Corp., 752 F.3d at 962–63 (explaining that the CCPA would only
overturn a prior ruling upon a finding of clear error).
44. See, e.g., In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 990 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (overruling, two years
later, In re Palmquist’s “time when the invention is made” approach with an
anticipatory filing approach); H.W. Robinson Air Freight Corp. v. United States, 48
C.C.P.A. 148, 152–53 (1961) (overruling, five years later, the court’s prior decision in
United States v. Damrak Trading Co., 43 C.C.P.A. 77 (1956), for “clear error”).
45. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 522 n.4, 529 (1966) (noting the “clear
conflict between the Patent Office and the CCPA”). The Supreme Court ultimately
agreed with the USPTO that the invention at issue—a method for making steroids of
unknown practical use—lacked utility. Id. at 531–32. Some judges at the CCPA pushed
back at the Supreme Court after Brenner, foreshadowing the Federal Circuit’s initial
resistance to the Supreme Court’s interventions. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 948
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (arguing that the Court should distinguish Brenner, not extend it).
46. Cf. Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent
Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 201 (2000) (criticizing the Federal Circuit for
“refus[ing] to apply administrative law principles” when reviewing patents denied by
the USPTO).
47. See, e.g, Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) did not grant the USPTO with “general substantive
rulemaking power”), vacated en banc, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam); Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that
Chevron deference did not apply to the USPTO on substantive patent law
questions); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458–59 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(holding that the Federal Circuit applied a “heightened level of scrutiny” over
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference’s decisions to ensure that the
court could properly “oversee complex legal determinations such as
obviousness”), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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the Federal Circuit viewed the expert agency as the court’s
handmaiden when it came to substantive patent law.
A number of cases demonstrate this dynamic. For example, in In re
Donaldson Co.,48 the Federal Circuit addressed the manner by which the
USPTO interpreted claims in “means-plus-function” format pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.49 That provision permits the use of functional
limitations in claims, but such limitations are construed to cover only the
structures disclosed in the specification that perform the claimed
function as well as equivalents to those structures.50 The USPTO,
however, refused to apply the statute. Instead, the agency simply looked
for anything in the prior art that would perform the claimed function
regardless of whether that structure had been disclosed in the patent.51
In other words, the USPTO construed means-plus-function claims to
cover any means of performing the claimed function.52
The Federal Circuit in Donaldson rejected the USPTO’s claim
construction approach, concluding that it was inconsistent with the
clear statutory mandate.53 The court held “that paragraph six applies
regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plusfunction language arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability
determination in the [US]PTO or as part of a validity or
infringement determination in a court.”54 The court also overruled
CCPA precedent that appeared to countenance the USPTO’s
approach.55 In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected the USPTO’s

48. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2006); Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1192. Congress
renumbered this section when it passed the America Invents Act so that, under
current law, the proper citation is § 112(f). At the time of Donaldson, however, the
convention was to describe § 112 based on the paragraphs within that section as they
were not numbered. Because the case used the old version of § 112, I will use the
older convention.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
51. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193 (noting that the USPTO refused to consider
structure in specification).
52. Id. at 1193 n.3 (highlighting the USPTO’s “practice of interpreting means-plusfunction language as reading on each and every means of performing that function”).
53. Id. at 1193 (clarifying that Congress’s language in paragraph six mandates
that the USPTO, when “construing means-plus-function language in a claim,” view
the specification according to all relevant factors such as “structure, material, or acts
described therein,” if available).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1193–94 (overruling In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957), and
In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1953), as well as “any other precedent of this court
suggest[ing] or hold[ing] to the contrary”).
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long-used practice,56 one that seemingly had been endorsed by the
Federal Circuit’s predecessor.57 Importantly, the Federal Circuit
specifically rejected the USPTO Commissioner’s argument that his
position was “entitled to deference in view of what the Commissioner
alleges is the [US]PTO’s sweeping and long-standing practice of not
applying paragraph six during examination.”58 The court noted that
the USPTO’s “fail[ure] to adhere to a statutory mandate over an
extended period of time does not justify its continuing to do so.”59
The court also concluded that there was no ambiguity in the statute
as to whether it applied to patent prosecution, thus eliminating
another potential avenue for affording the USPTO’s approach some
deference.60 The court, therefore, asserted its dominion over the
expert agency, rejecting decades-old procedures and overruling
precedent that embraced that approach. In this sense, the court’s
decision in Donaldson is a striking managerial decision.
Perhaps no case exemplifies the tension between the Federal
Circuit and the USPTO better than In re Kemps.61 The case was a runof-the-mill obviousness case, but the USPTO used it as a vehicle to
advocate for a different standard of review of its factual
determinations.62 The Federal Circuit had long held that it reviewed
USPTO fact-finding under the “clearly erroneous” standard.63 In
previous cases, the USPTO had argued to change the standard to the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)64 “arbitrary and capricious”
standard.65 In Kemps, however, the USPTO—in the words of the

56. See Thomas L. Stoll & Kara A. Farnandez, Means for Functioning in a Vacuum?,
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 239, 243 (1994) (noting that the Federal Circuit
had “reversed . . . a long standing policy”).
57. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 548 (“[N]otwithstanding the third paragraph of section
112, it is the language itself of the claims which must particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention,
without limitations imported from the specification, whether such language is
couched in terms of means plus function or consists of a detailed recitation of the
inventive matter.”), overruled by Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189.
58. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996), abrogated by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
62. Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1430.
63. See, e.g., In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]e review any
underlying facts found by the Board under the clearly erroneous standard.”).
64. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
65. Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1431 n.4; see, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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Federal Circuit—“presumptuously assumed this standard for briefing
and argument” without arguing for en banc reconsideration.66
Needless to say, the Federal Circuit was not pleased. The court
noted that “[t]he briefing of the entire case by the [US]PTO under
the incorrect standard was inappropriate.”67 The court faulted the
USPTO for “unfairly burden[ing] the applicant” who “felt like ‘a
bystander to some long-running dispute to which he really is not a
party.’”68 The court also faulted the USPTO for failing to argue for en
banc consideration: “the [US]PTO simply declared that the standard
of review was ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ briefed the case as such, and
effectively disregarded the substantial precedent behind the court’s
standard of review, with only a footnote recognizing the correct
standard.”69 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that this case
would have been decided the same way under either standard;
therefore, the issue was not ripe for decision.70 The court concluded,
Accordingly, regardless of the merits of the [US]PTO’s argument
that the APA standard should be applied, the use of that standard
in this case was inappropriate and unnecessary. It unfairly
burdened Kemps and did not present an issue requiring
determination. Under these circumstances, we consider the
[US]PTO’s brief and argument less forthright than we expect and
normally receive.71

Acting on a somewhat odd suggestion by the Federal Circuit,72 the
USPTO eventually did find an appropriate vehicle to challenge the
standard of review en banc.73
The en banc Federal Circuit
considered the arguments made by the USPTO but remained
unpersuaded, maintaining the “clearly erroneous” standard and
concluding that the standard was exempt under the APA.74 The
Federal Circuit stated that 5 U.S.C. § 559 exempted the USPTO from

66. Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1431 & n.4.
67. Id. at 1430–31.
68. Id. at 1431.
69. Id. (footnote omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 889 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The argument is
appropriately made in a petition suggesting rehearing in banc, in a case such as this,
wherein the court has decided that clear error by the Board requires reversal.”
(emphasis added)), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc),
rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
73. Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447.
74. Id. at 1449.
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“arbitrary and capricious” review.75 Tellingly, the court noted that
the clear error standard helps “avoid situations where board fact
finding on matters such as anticipation or the factual inquiries
underlying obviousness become virtually unreviewable.”76
This
language suggests that, to some extent, the Federal Circuit distrusts
the USPTO’s determinations.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit. The Court
granted certiorari and held that the APA does apply to USPTO factfinding, although it declined to determine which APA review standard
applied.77 The Federal Circuit subsequently adopted the “substantial
evidence” standard of review,78 thus denying the USPTO its original
goal of a highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard.
Moreover, even in the face of seeming defeat by the Supreme Court
in favor of the USPTO, the Federal Circuit pushed back a bit more.
Perhaps in a case of “be careful what you wish for,” the Federal Circuit
made clear that the USPTO’s fact-finding must be supported by the
evidence of record and not merely from the expertise of the Agency.79
The Federal Circuit’s tough treatment of the USPTO is not
surprising. The expert court is reviewing the expert agency, and it is
foreseeable that the court would want to assert its supremacy.
The above discussion, however, is not meant to suggest that the
Federal Circuit always disagreed with the USPTO. At times, the court
did agree with moves by the Agency. For example, the State Street

75. Id. at 1452. Section 559 states that “[the provisions of this section] do not
limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized
by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012). Because the USPTO predates the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), the court concluded that the “clearly erroneous” standard
arose prior to the APA and thus fell within the exception. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452.
76. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1458.
77. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 154, 165; see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (highlighting the Supreme Court’s failure in Dickinson to approve an
appropriate standard of review for the USPTO’s finding of fact as either (1) the
arbitrary and capricious test or (2) the substantial evidence test).
78. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313.
79. In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the
APA’s “[d]eferential judicial review” provision reinforces the agency’s requirement
for evidence-based findings); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“With respect to core factual findings in a determination of patentability, however,
the Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding or
experience—or on its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common
sense. Rather, the Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in
support of these findings.”).
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Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.80 case came to the
Federal Circuit from district court infringement litigation and not
from the USPTO.81 The Federal Circuit ultimately confirmed the
patentability of business methods (albeit for a limited time).82
Necessarily, for this issue to arise in litigation, the USPTO had
already begun issuing patents on business methods, so the State Street
decision confirmed what the USPTO had already been doing: issuing
business method patents.83 The Federal Circuit also agreed with the
USPTO when it made the utility standard “more stringent”84 in the
face of patent applications on gene fragments.85
Nevertheless, in this early era, the Federal Circuit was willing and
able to disagree with the USPTO in areas where one might think a
court should defer. The expert court, in the face of an absent
Supreme Court, was arrogating power to itself at the expense of the
expert agency it reviewed.
II. THE TRANSITION: SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION AND
ASCENDANCE OF THE USPTO AS AN AGENCY
The Supreme Court’s relative absence in matters handled by the
Federal Circuit began to change at the turn of the millennium. The
Court started to send signals that it was concerned with both the
institution and the doctrine of the Federal Circuit. Meanwhile, the
Federal Circuit, in the face of a reengaging Supreme Court and a new
patent statute, began to treat the USPTO differently. This Part
discusses the transition.

80. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
81. Id. at 1370.
82. See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 525–26 (2011) (noting
that the Federal Circuit first addressed and upheld the patentability of business
methods in State Street but backtracked on its approval ten years later in Bilski).
83. See id. at 523–25 (positing that the USPTO, reacting to the rapidly changing
landscape of patents, began to issue business method patents without an “explicit
signal of validity from the Federal Circuit”).
84. Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 100 (2000) (acknowledging that the USPTO, after
implementing the new stringent utility standard, expected applicants to challenge its
validity in federal court or with the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences).
85. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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A. The Supreme Court Takes a Harsher Tone with the Federal Circuit
The Supreme Court may have been invisible for the first twenty or
so years of the Federal Circuit. But the Court began to indicate that
the sleeping giant was about to awaken.
The earliest tea leaves could be seen in the Court’s decision in Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.86 This case is effectively a
“bookend” to Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,87 as the
Court took Festo as a chance to correct the Federal Circuit’s
misapprehension of Warner-Jenkinson.88 In doing so, the Court was
not kind. Whereas the Court in Warner-Jenkinson used deferential
language in discussing the Federal Circuit’s expertise,89 the Court in
Festo chastised the Federal Circuit for “ignor[ing] the guidance of
Warner-Jenkinson.”90 The Court noted that “[t]he responsibility for
changing [rules regarding the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel] rests with Congress. Fundamental
alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations
of inventors in their property.”91 There was no deference to the
Federal Circuit’s expertise in this case.
Perhaps the most telling case foreshadowing the Court’s
reengagement with patent law and the Federal Circuit was Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.92 The Federal
Circuit’s decision in the case was of no moment: a non-precedential
order sending the case back to the district court to reconsider its
judgment in light of the Supreme Court’s trade dress functionality
decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.93 The Court
nevertheless took the case to address the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction
over appeals where the patent cause of action arose in the
86. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
87. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
88. Id. at 41; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in
Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 72 (2012) (describing Festo as a “bookend” to the Supreme
Court’s doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence that started with Warner-Jenkinson).
89. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (“We leave it to the Federal
Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty,
consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.”); id. at 40 (“[W]e see no
purpose in going further and micromanaging the Federal Circuit’s particular word
choice for analyzing equivalence. . . . [W]e leave such refinement to that court’s
sound judgment in this area of its special expertise.”).
90. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739.
91. Id.
92. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
93. 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
13 F. App’x 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated, 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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counterclaim.94 Rejecting a long-standing Federal Circuit rule, the
Supreme Court held that a compulsory counterclaim of patent
infringement did not trigger the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.95
Although the majority decision rested solely on its statutory
interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s “arising under” jurisdiction,
Justice Stevens went on to comment on the importance of the Court’s
decision.96 His remarks revealed a suspicion of the Federal Circuit as
an expert court:
Necessarily, therefore, other circuits will have some role to play in
the development of this area of the law. An occasional conflict in
decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this
Court’s attention. Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with
broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the
specialized court may develop an institutional bias.97

The Court sent a similar signal, particularly with respect to patenteligible subject matter, in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,98 in which it dismissed the writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted.99 Three justices dissented, however, in
telling fashion. Writing for the three, Justice Breyer concluded that
the patent at issue clearly did not constitute eligible subject matter.100
In particular, Justice Breyer noted an important role for the Supreme
Court in patent law: “a decision from this generalist Court could
contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists
and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently
administered and enforced, adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’
that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’”101
The Federal Circuit began to react to such browbeating. In In re
Bilski,102 the court took pains to interpret fairly inconsistent Supreme
Court precedent103 regarding subject matter eligibility to divine an
94. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 827.
95. Id. at 834.
96. Id. at 835 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 839.
98. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam).
99. Id. at 125.
100. Id. at 137–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 138 (omission and alteration in original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)).
102. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593 (2010).
103. See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 380 (2015) (“The [Supreme] Court seems
quite reticent to revisit its case law—in any patent context for that matter—to
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appropriate test for business method claims.104 In light of Laboratory
Corp., it was clear that the Federal Circuit was attempting to head off
Supreme Court review.105 Of course, such efforts proved futile as the
Court granted certiorari in Bilski.106
The Federal Circuit’s intransigence was not yet done, however.
After deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two
parallel cases, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC107 and
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,108 vacated the
Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the cases for
reconsideration (GVR) in light of Bilski.109
In Classen, the invention related to “methods for evaluating and
improving the safety of immunization schedules.”110 The district
court invalidated the claims for want of patentable subject matter.111
In a one paragraph decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s judgment in light of the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in
In re Bilski.112 After the Supreme Court GVR’d the case, the Federal
Circuit on remand changed its original conclusions, finding that two
of the three claims were not invalid under § 101.113 Of course, a GVR
does not mean the Supreme Court necessarily disagreed with the
outcome below,114 but the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski made it
easier to invalidate claims on the basis of § 101. Yet, on remand, the
evaluate whether its doctrine is consistent.
Instead of grappling with the
inconsistencies in its own decisions, the Court simply recites facts and holdings from
its earlier jurisprudence in the hopes that one can discern consistencies.”).
104. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56. For criticism of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in
Bilski, see Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
419, 429–32 (2012) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s interpretations of Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), as requiring the machine-or-transformation test).
105. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (recognizing that the Supreme Court may change or
altogether eliminate the “machine-or-transformation” test to accommodate new
technologies).
106. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
107. No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304
F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded by 561 U.S. 1040
(2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
108. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded by 561 U.S.
1040 (2010), rev’d, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
109. 561 U.S. 1040.
110. Classen, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1.
111. Id. at *6.
112. Classen, 304 F. App’x at 867.
113. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1059.
114. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting that a GVR order “does not create an implication that the lower court
should change its prior determination”).
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court found previously invalidated claims to not be invalid, which is
incongruent with the holding in Bilski. Showing further resistance,
Judge Rader, joined by Judge Newman, offered additional views on
the case, arguing that the Federal Circuit “should decline to accept
invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.”115 In Judge Rader’s
view, patentable subject matter is a “coarse filter” that should not be
used extensively.116 Judge Moore, the author of the original panel
decision, dissented, arguing that the case was “not even close.”117
Thus, the Federal Circuit resisted the guidance of the Supreme Court
in Bilski under which more patents would be invalid for claiming
ineligible subject matter.
The Federal Circuit’s resistance to the Supreme Court became
even more apparent in Prometheus. The original panel had held that
the patented invention—a correlation of metabolite levels in the
blood to optimize the dosage of a drug—constituted eligible subject
matter.118 After the GVR, the court stood its ground and held, again,
that the patent claimed patentable subject matter under § 101.119
The Federal Circuit gave short shrift to Bilski120: much of the
language in the decision on remand was verbatim to the earlier
decision.121 Such dismissive treatment of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bilski likely did not sit well with the Court, triggering the
subsequent substantive review—and rejection—of the Federal
Circuit’s judgment in the case.122

115. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074 (Rader and Newman, JJ., additional views). Because two
judges joined these additional views, technically it should be part of the majority opinion.
116. Id.; see also Holbrook & Janis, supra note 103, at 352–53 (discussing the Federal
Circuit’s competing conceptions of § 101 as a coarse filter versus “eligibility-as-king”).
117. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1078 (Moore, J., dissenting).
118. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded by 561 U.S. 1040 (2010), rev’d, 628
F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
119. Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1349 (“On remand, we again hold that Prometheus’s
asserted method claims are drawn to statutory subject matter, and we again reverse
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity under § 101.”).
120. Id. at 1355 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski did not undermine our
preemption analysis of Prometheus’s claims and it rejected the machine-ortransformation test only as a definitive test. . . . Thus, the Court did not disavow the
machine-or-transformation test. And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful
and important clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling
conclusion, [namely], that the present claims pass muster under § 101.”).
121. Compare id. at 1356–57, with Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346–47.
122. Holbrook, supra note 88, at 73–74.
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The Prometheus pattern between the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court repeated itself in the Myriad string of cases.123 The
Federal Circuit initially held that claims covering breast cancerrelated genes were patentable subject matter.124 The Supreme Court
GVR’d the case in light of Prometheus.125 On remand, the Federal
Circuit again found the claims patent eligible, marginalizing the
importance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Prometheus.126 And,
again, the Supreme Court granted review.127 The Court held that the
claims to isolated DNA were ineligible but those to complementary
DNA were eligible128—the only time the Supreme Court has found a
claim to cover eligible subject matter in its recent line of § 101 cases.
The import of these decisions began to sink in, apparently, with
some of the Federal Circuit judges. The court’s fractured en banc
decision in Alice Corp. shows, to some extent, a shift at the court and a
willingness to defer to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on §
101.129 Of course, it also shows the lack of guidance in the Supreme
Court’s precedent.130 The Supreme Court’s decision to review the
case, however, appears to be because of the fracture at the Federal
Circuit and not a failure of the court to appreciate the earlier
Supreme Court decisions. Of course, there is a bit of irony in the
Supreme Court chastising the Federal Circuit for disrupting the
settled expectations of the innovation community when the Court’s

123. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); see also Holbrook, supra note 88, at 73.
124. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334.
125. Myriad Genetics, 132 S. Ct. 1794.
126. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the Supreme Court decision in Mayo did
not control the issue at hand), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); id. at 1326 (noting that
Mayo provided insight and outlined the broad principles at issue but holding that
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers were the more directly applicable precedents).
127. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012).
128. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
129. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
130. Tim Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court About to Rule that Software Is Ineligible for
Patent Protection?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
realspin/2014/03/16/is-the-supreme-court-about-to-rule-that-software-is-ineligiblefor-patent-protection.
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rulings themselves utterly reshaped the legal landscape in terms of
patent-eligible subject matter.131
B. In Part Due to the Supreme Court and Congress, the Gravitational Pull
of the Patent System Shifts Towards the USPTO
The Federal Circuit’s dynamic with the USPTO also began to
change during this period. Some of this change may have been in
response to the Supreme Court’s reengagement with patent law,
bringing the Court’s administrative eye to patent law. In particular,
the Court agreed with the USPTO that the APA applied to its factfinding.132 After Dickinson v. Zurko,133 it was clear the USPTO was to
be treated the same as other administrative agencies.
This shift in viewing the USPTO akin to other agencies began to
take hold at the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit was poised to
micromanage procedural aspects of the USPTO, although it
mainly deferred to what the USPTO had done.134 After growing
criticism that patent applicants could file limitless numbers of
continuation applications,135 the USPTO promulgated rules to
limit the number of such filings as well as the number of claims in
an application.136 A number of parties challenged the rules, and
the district court hearing the challenge agreed that the USPTO
had exceeded its rulemaking authority. 137
The Federal Circuit partly agreed with the district court. The
expert court confirmed that the USPTO has no substantive
131. See Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 74 (2016) (noting that before the
Supreme Court cases, “challenges to patentability based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 were
rare,” but such challenges “now consume a significant portion of [the Federal
Circuit’s] docket”).
132. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999).
133. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
134. William G. Jenks, I Lost at the USPTO, What Are My Chances on Appeal?,
LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 26, 27.
135. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004) (explaining that the patent system allowed
unlimited attempts to persuade a patent examiner to approve an application).
136. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007).
137. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that “the
USPTO’s rulemaking authority . . . does not extend to substantive rules,” so the
substantive rules at issue were void), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Tafas v.
Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (per curiam).
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rulemaking authority.138 The court also agreed that the USPTO is
entitled to Chevron deference when it promulgates procedural
rules.139 The Federal Circuit, unlike the district court, concluded that
the rules at issue were procedural.140 The court ultimately ruled that
all but one of the rules was a legitimate exercise of USPTO
authority.141 The Federal Circuit, therefore, initially demurred to a
radical departure in USPTO practice. The court subsequently took
the case en banc,142 but it never reached a decision. When there was
a change in the presidential administration, the USPTO withdrew the
new rules, mooting the case.143 It is hard to predict what the en banc
court would have done, perhaps invalidating all of the rules in a
manner akin to the court’s earlier history. The panel decision,
however, demonstrated a willingness to defer to the USPTO in ways
that seem different from the court’s earlier era.
The shift in the Federal Circuit’s relationship with the USPTO took
a hard turn in 2011 when Congress adopted the AIA. The AIA
created a variety of post-issuance review proceedings.144 The most
important of these is the inter partes review (IPR).145 These
proceedings created alternatives to the district courts to allow parties
to challenge the validity of patents.146 These proceedings have
proven to be exceedingly popular, and appeals from the USPTO have
begun to dominate the Federal Circuit’s docket.147 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the relationship between the Federal
Circuit and the USPTO has changed.

138. Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1352–53.
139. Id. at 1354.
140. Id. at 1356.
141. Id. at 1349.
142. Tafas, 328 F. App’x 658.
143. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (Oct. 14, 2009).
144. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011).
145. IPR is a proceeding to determine patentability on a ground that could be
raised under sections 102 or 103. Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trial
s/inter-partes-review (last updated Jan. 29, 2016).
146. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 301 (allowing for inter partes review to
challenge a patent only if the petitioner has not yet filed a civil claim).
147. Jason Rantanen, Data on Federal Circuit Appeals and Decisions, PATENTLY-O
(June 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/circuit-appeals-decisions.html.

HOLBROOK.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1082

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/17 11:35 AM

[Vol. 66:1061

III. THE MODERN ERA: ACQUIESCENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT AND
TO USPTO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
In the last few years, these dynamics have shifted noticeably. The
Supreme Court has reengaged significantly in patent law, reviewing
over forty patent cases (depending on what counts as a “patent” case)
since 2000.148 These cases now deal with core patent law issues.149
The Court has reworked the law of induced infringement,150 given
deference to fact-finding in claim construction,151 and made it easier
to shift attorney fees152 and demonstrate willful infringement.153
Indeed, causing more psychodrama than perhaps any other area is
the tetralogy of cases dealing with patentable subject matter that
effected a seismic shift in the law.154
There has been a similar sea change at the USPTO. With the
passage of the AIA, the USPTO has become a popular venue for
challenging patents through the various post-issuance proceedings,
particularly IPRs.155 Appeals from IPRs have come to dominate the
Federal Circuit’s docket.
The Federal Circuit’s response to both of these changes has been
somewhat surprising: acquiescence. The Federal Circuit generally
has taken the Supreme Court’s decisions to heart and is attempting

148. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court Concerned with Patent Law, the
Federal Circuit, or Both: A Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyk, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
(forthcoming 2017).
149. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 1–2 (2007) (explaining the Court’s shift from addressing
issues on the periphery of patent law to cases that go to the heart of patent issues).
150. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015);
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). See generally
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent
Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1010–25 (2016) (discussing four Supreme
Court cases impacting doctrine of inducing infringement).
151. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015).
152. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1752–53 (2014).
153. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016).
154. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
155. Rich Steeves, Inter Partes Review Gains in Popularity, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/03/13/inter-partes-review-gains-in-popularity.
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to follow them, even if the Federal Circuit judges happen to disagree
with the Court.156
A. The Federal Circuit Falls in Line (Even at Times when Patent
Practitioners Wanted Them to Push Back)
The Supreme Court’s deluge of cases has rejected many of the
bright-line rules created by the Federal Circuit.157 The Court rejected
the absolute bar rule for prosecution history estoppel;158 the nearly
per se grant of permanent injunctions after a finding of infringement;159
the “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for declaratory judgment
jurisdiction;160 and the court’s formalistic application of the teaching,
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test to combine prior art references to
conclude a claimed invention is non-obvious, such that an invention can
be obvious if it is obvious to try.161 More recent decisions have thrown
out the Federal Circuit’s formalistic rules for fee-shifting and
enhanced damages, along with the attending de novo review
standards that aggrandized the Federal Circuit’s power.162
The Federal Circuit generally has followed these shifts in the law.
It has found the Festo presumption of complete surrender of equivalents
to be rebutted in a few cases.163 It has permitted far more denials of
permanent injunctions than in the past.164 The court has even reversed

156. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
157. See Dyk, supra note 131, at 80–81; Holbrook, supra note 88, at 76–77. For a
thorough discussion and evaluation of the relationship between the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court as to formalistic rules, see generally David O. Taylor,
Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Precedent and Policy, 66 SMU L.
REV. 633 (2013).
158. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002).
159. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
160. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007).
161. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
162. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016); Octane
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014); Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1746–47 (2014).
163. Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Conspicuously, the Federal Circuit has never found the Festo presumption
rebutted on the basis of unforeseeability.
164. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay:
An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1982–83 (2016).
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the grant of a permanent injunction.165 The Federal Circuit also
expressly rejected its “reasonable apprehension of suit” test for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, instead now using a more holistic,
contextual analysis.166 Perhaps most tellingly, the Federal Circuit has
stepped back from its use of the TSM test and has embraced the
“obvious to try” methodology of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.167
The court appears to have acquiesced in the chaos flowing from
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on eligible subject matter. In
cases involving § 101 challenges, the court now readily affirms the
district courts’ judgments of invalidity.168 Indeed, it is the vast
minority of cases where the court finds the claimed invention to
constitute eligible subject matter when the issue is raised.169 Many
observers hoped the Federal Circuit would push back against the
Supreme Court’s decisions.170 The particular vehicle for this hope
165. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
But see Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An
Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 149
(2017) (noting that the Federal Circuit affirms grants of permanent injunctions at a
significantly higher rate than it affirms denials).
166. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1283–84
(Fed. Cir. 2007); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
167. 550 U.S. 398 (2007); see Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d
1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“Insofar as Deuel implies the obviousness inquiry cannot consider that the
combination of the claim’s constituent elements was ‘obvious to try,’ the Supreme
Court in KSR unambiguously discredited that holding.”).
168. Jason Rantanen, Section 101—Pivotal Moment for Clarity on Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 21, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/sectio
n-subject-eligibility.html; David Scannell et al., A Chilly Reception for Section 101
Challenges at the ITC, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP: MOFO @ ITC (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://mofoatitc.mofo.com/alj-decisions/a-chilly-reception-for-section-101-challenge
s-at-the-itc.
169. Rantanen, supra note 168 (noting that seventy percent of cases result in
invalidity).
170. See, e.g., id. (asserting that the Federal Circuit must delineate the “proper
scope and application of [s]ection 101” so that the United States can maintain “its
competitive edge” in the biotech and software industries); The Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO) and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and in Favor of En Banc
Reconsideration (Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1144), Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Michael A. Sanzo, The Patenting of Gene Based
Diagnostic Assays in a Post Mayo and Myriad World, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 1, 16 (2016) (“To the extent that people in the patent community may have
maintained any lingering hope for something similar after the decision discussed
above, this hope was badly damaged by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariosa v.
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was the case Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.171 The invention
related to the discovery of cell-free fetal DNA (“cffDNA”) in maternal
plasma and serum, which can be used to diagnose various genetic
abnormalities in a fetus.172 The use of cffDNA revolutionized
obstetrics, permitting diagnosis without the use of higher-risk,
intrusive amniocentesis.173 If any case seemed appropriate to offer
resistance to the Supreme Court, this case appeared to be the one.
Yet the Federal Circuit held that the claims covering this
revolutionary technology were not patent-eligible subject matter.174 In
a surprising level of transparency, a number of the judges expressly
noted that they believed the invention to be patent-eligible but were
nonetheless bound by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.175 The
judges went as far as to offer critiques of the Supreme Court’s
decisions, yet they continued to adhere to those decisions.176
Sequenom.”); Christopher Holman, Federal Circuit Decides Ariosa, and It’s Not Good News
for Innovation in the Life Sciences, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (June 12, 2015),
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/federal-circuit-decides-ariosaand-its.html.
171. 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
172. Id. at 1373–74.
173. Philip Merksamer, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of Mayo and
Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent Eligibility for Molecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 495, 495 (2016).
174. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1373.
175. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“In sum, it is unsound
to have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility
on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus conventional steps, or
that they claim abstract concepts. But I agree that the panel did not err in its
conclusion that under Supreme Court precedent it had no option other than to
affirm the district court.”); id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc) (“Yet I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that a too restrictive test
for patent eligibility . . . may discourage development and disclosure of new
diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the life sciences . . . . This leads me to think
that some further illumination as to the scope of Mayo would be beneficial in one
limited aspect. At the same time I think that we are bound by the language of Mayo,
and any further guidance must come from the Supreme Court, not this court.”);
Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) (“I join the court’s opinion . . . only
because I am bound by the sweeping language of the test set out in [Mayo] . . . . This
case represents the consequence—perhaps unintended—of that broad language in
excluding a meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves and should
have been entitled to retain.”).
176. Ariosa, 809 F.3d at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc) (“But against the accusation that such a claim to the invention might be
considered mere draftsmanship and thus still ineligible under the seemingly
expansive holding of Mayo, it must be said that a process, composition of matter,
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The modern Federal Circuit, therefore, appears to have acquiesced
to the deluge of Supreme Court review. It generally has embraced
the changes in the law with less resistance than one might expect
from an expert court.
B. Federal Circuit Defers to USPTO in IPR Proceedings
The Federal Circuit’s acquiescence to the Supreme Court parallels
its new-found deference to the USPTO. IPRs and post-grant reviews
have proven to be quite popular, with large numbers of petitions—
particularly IPRs—filed.177
These filings have resulted in an
explosion in the number of appeals to the Federal Circuit from the
USPTO.178
These new proceedings have the potential to
fundamentally rework the relationships among the USPTO, the
district courts, and the Federal Circuit.179 The Federal Circuit already
appears to be deferring readily to decisions by the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB),180 though this deference could be in part due
to a self-interest in avoiding drowning in the deluge of appeals.
Interestingly, however, the Federal Circuit has also hamstrung its
own ability to review various aspects of PTAB decisions. In In re

article of manufacture, and machine are different implementations of ideas, and
differentiating among them in claim drafting is a laudable professional skill, not
necessarily a devious device for avoiding prohibitions.”); id. at 1289–90 (Dyk, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“I worry that method claims that apply
newly discovered natural laws and phenomena in somewhat conventional ways are
screened out by the Mayo test. In this regard I think that Mayo may not be entirely
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad.”).
177. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 66 (2016)
(revealing that the number of petitions for IPR filed per month has risen from 20
when the IPR procedure became available to approximately 140).
178. Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Now Receiving More Appeals Arising from the PTO
than the District Courts, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/201
6/03/receiving-appeals-district.html.
179. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2015).
180. Christopher A. Suarez, Navigating Inter Partes Review in the Federal Circuit: A
Statistical Review, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 49, 50 (finding that the Federal Circuit
affirmed the PTAB in IPRs eighty-two percent of the time; sixty-one percent of
Federal Circuit’s IPR decisions are summary affirmances under Rule 36); Matt
Cutler, Federal Circuit Broadly Affirms PTAB’s Determinations on Analogous Art, Motivation
to Combine References, and Obviousness of Claims, IPR-PGR.COM (Nov. 29, 2016),
http://ipr-pgr.com/federal-circuit-broadly-affirms-ptabs-determinations-on-analogou
s-art-motivation-to-combine-references-and-obviousness-of-claims.
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Cuozzo Speeding Technologies, LLC,181 the Federal Circuit confronted,
inter alia, two issues that related to the relationship between the
USPTO and the court.182 The first was whether the Federal Circuit
could review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR after the PTAB
had reached a final decision.183 The second was whether the PTAB
was appropriately using the “broadest reasonable interpretation”
(BRI) standard for claim construction, which is used by USPTO
patent examiners during the prosecution of a patent application,184
instead of the standard used in district court litigation.185
The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO on both issues. As to
the court’s ability to review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR, the
Federal Circuit provided a strong prohibition on such review.186 The
court looked to the language of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), which notes that
the decision whether to institute review is “final and nonappealable.”187
The court viewed this as a complete prohibition on the ability of the
court to review the PTAB’s decision to institute review, even if there
may be some flaws in that analysis or questions about the USPTO’s
authority.188 In those scenarios, a petition for mandamus may be a
means of review, but review as a matter of right is not available.189
As to the claim construction standard, the court held that Congress
had implicitly adopted the BRI standard.190 The court reasoned that
“[t]here is no indication that the AIA was designed to change the
claim construction standard that the PTO has applied for more than
100 years.”191 As such, “[i]t can therefore be inferred that Congress
impliedly approved the existing rule of adopting the broadest
reasonable construction.”192 The court rejected the argument that
the limited ability to amend the claims in an IPR justified departure

181. 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
182. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273, 1275.
183. Id. at 1272–73.
184. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015).
185. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1275.
186. Id. at 1273.
187. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
188. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1274 (“Cuozzo argues that Congress would not have
intended to allow the PTO to institute IPR in direct contravention of the
statute . . . .”).
189. Id. (explaining that a petitioner must show a “clear and indisputable right” or
“irremediable interim harm” to pursue mandamus).
190. Id. at 1278.
191. Id. at 1276–77.
192. Id.
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from the BRI standard, which had been justified on the ability of an
applicant to routinely amend her claims to avoid a patentability
problem during prosecution.193 Additionally, even if Congress did
not implicitly embrace the BRI standard, the court concluded it was a
reasonable exercise of USPTO rulemaking authority.194
Both of these holdings show deference to the USPTO. The first
limits the ability of the Federal Circuit to second-guess the PTAB’s
decisions. The second, although initially couched in terms of
congressional intent, also demonstrates a willingness to defer to
USPTO rulemaking. In some regards, this deference represents an
erosion of the “procedural v. substantive” rulemaking line. Indeed, it
is not entirely clear whether the claim construction standard should
be viewed as substantive or procedural.195
The Supreme Court did review Cuozzo, and it ultimately agreed
with the Federal Circuit on both issues.196 Its reasoning, however,
differed in many regards from that of the Federal Circuit’s decision.
Indeed, the Supreme Court decision reads far more like an
administrative law decision than a patent law one.197 The Court’s
reasoning as to the reviewability issue differed from that of the
Federal Circuit, and it appears to have opened the door to review of
some initiation decisions, such as those raising constitutional issues or
an abuse of authority by the USPTO.198 As to the BRI claim
construction standard, the Court did not find an implicit adoption of
that standard by Congress; instead, it performed a traditional Chevron
analysis, concluding that the regulations adopting the BRI standard
properly filled a “gap” in the statutory framework.199
The Federal Circuit seemingly has turned a new page in its
relationship with the USPTO. It is now, after some reminding by the
193. Id. at 1277–78.
194. Id. at 1278–79.
195. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact
on Claim Construction, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 319 (2016).
196. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
197. See Holbrook, supra note 195, at 20–23.
198. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141 (“This means that we need not, and do not, decide
the precise effect of § 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that
depend on other less closely related statutes, or that present other questions of
interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well beyond ‘this section.’”);
see also Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. Athena Automation Ltd., 838 F.3d 1236,
1243 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
199. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142 (“The statute contains such a gap: No statutory
provision unambiguously directs the agency to use one standard or the other.”); see
also id. at 2144–45.
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Supreme Court, that the USPTO is an administrative agency, and review
of its rules and decisions should be treated accordingly.200 The Federal
Circuit has begun to afford the USPTO deference in this regard.
CONCLUSION—WILL THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CONTINUE TO ACQUIESCE
IN AQUA AND WI-FI ONE?
The above analysis suggests that there has been a shift at the
Federal Circuit with respect to its relationships with the Supreme Court
and the USPTO. Early in its existence—and with some justification—
the Federal Circuit made itself the center of patent law. In more recent
years, however, it has allowed the responsibility for the development of
patent law to diffuse to both the Supreme Court and the USPTO.
Of course, the image portrayed in this Essay is a bit of a caricature.
First, any shift in the perspective of the Federal Circuit has evolved
over time, so the demarcations above are somewhat arbitrary.
Second, there are examples of where the Federal Circuit may yet be
obstinate in the face of Supreme Court precedent. For example, in
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,201 the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s twenty-year-old de novo standard of
review for claim construction.202 The Court concluded that there are
facts incident to claim construction such that, when present, the
Federal Circuit should review the district court’s fact-finding for clear
error.203 Instead of ushering in a dramatic change in patent litigation,
Teva has proven to be a non-moment.204 In order to avoid deference,
the Federal Circuit generally viewed the intrinsic evidence—the claims,
specification, and prosecution history—as unambiguous,205 review of

200. Accord Rai, supra note 46, at 201 (calling for treatment of the USPTO as an
administrative agency).
201. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
202. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272,
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (confirming de novo review of claim construction),
abrogated by Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836; Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (confirming de novo review established in
Markman), abrogated by Teva Pharm., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836; Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that claim
construction is reviewed de novo), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
203. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 838.
204. See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 430, 448 (2015) (explaining how the Federal Circuit has “managed to
marginalize Teva v. Sandoz”).
205. Id.; see also Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v.
Sandoz, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deferen
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which is performed de novo even under Teva.206 As such, the Federal
Circuit has worked to undermine the holding in Teva.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit appears to be grafting a brighter rule
onto its permanent injunction analysis. The Supreme Court in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.207 faulted both the district court and the
Federal Circuit for using a categorical analysis in determining the
appropriateness of a permanent injunction.208 In recent cases,
however, the Federal Circuit has articulated a requirement for a
“causal nexus” between the acts of infringement and the irreparable
harm to the patent holder.209 Some commentators view this as the
emergence of another categorical requirement, in contravention of
eBay.210 Additionally, a recent study shows that the Federal Circuit is
far more likely to reverse a denial of a permanent injunction than a
grant, suggesting that the court is not deferring to district courts and
is applying the eBay standard in a pro-patent way.211 This difference
arises even though the standard of review is abuse of discretion.212
That said, perhaps such reversals are not surprising given the
court’s expertise. Indeed, in an apparent thaw at the Supreme Court,
Justice Breyer suggested that the Federal Circuit’s expertise could
inform discretionary review in a different context. After years of
generally criticizing the Federal Circuit’s doctrine,213 Justice Breyer’s
ce-supreme-sandoz.html (“The Federal Circuit will continue to use the Phillips
hierarchy, turning to extrinsic evidence only when the intrinsic evidence is
ambiguous. I think, in the main, the Federal Circuit will view the intrinsic evidence
as determinative, retaining de novo review in the vast majority of cases.” (quoting
Timothy R. Holbrook)).
206. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841 (“As all parties agree, when the district court
reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications,
along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount
solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that
construction de novo.”).
207. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
208. Id. at 393.
209. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). See
generally Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 61 (2016) (discussing the causation requirement and the Federal
Circuit’s arguable watering down of the requirement).
210. David H. Dolkas & Rita J. Yoon, Supreme Court’s eBay Decision on Patent
Injunctions—Time for a Comeback?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.bna.com/supreme-courts-ebay-n17179924841.
211. Holte & Seaman, supra note 165, at 46–48.
212. Id. at 46–47.
213. See, e.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117
(2014) (“The Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means
to infringe a method patent.”).
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concurrence in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.214 gestures
to the Federal Circuit’s expertise, the first such reference since
Warner-Jenkinson nineteen years earlier: “The Court holds that awards
of enhanced damages should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
I agree. But I also believe that, in applying that standard, the Federal
Circuit may take advantage of its own experience and expertise in
patent law.”215 There may be a thawing on the part of the Supreme
Court with respect to its views of the Federal Circuit.
The acts of the Supreme Court are outside the control of the
Federal Circuit. But the Federal Circuit does control its relationship
with the USPTO. Although it seems the court has entered an era of
deference to the USPTO, two pending en banc cases could portend a
change in that dynamic. The era of Federal Circuit acquiescence, at
least with respect to the USPTO, may be coming to a close.216
The Federal Circuit recently heard argument en banc in In re Aqua
Products, Inc.217 The case involved the ability of patent holders in IPRs
to amend their claims.218 The USPTO has been stingy in allowing
such amendments.219 The Federal Circuit initially deferred to the
rules promulgated by the USPTO.220 The court is now questioning
those rules and seems poised to reject them.221
214. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
215. Id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
216. Hence, the “(?)” in this Essay’s title.
217. 833 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam) (argument on Dec. 9, 2016).
218. Id. at 1336.
219. See In Rare Move, PTAB Grants Motion to Amend in IPR Proceeding, NAT’L L. REV.
(May 3, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/rare-move-ptab-grants-motion-toamend-ipr-proceeding (explaining that while 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 permits claim
amendments, it allows courts to deny motions to amend where “the amendment does not
respond to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial, or if the amendment seeks to
enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter”).
220. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Prolitec,
Inc. v. ScentAir Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But see Veritas
Techs. LLC v. Veeam Software Corp., 835 F.3d 1406, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding
PTAB abused its discretion in refusing amendment).
221. The en banc order requested briefing on two particular issues:
(a) When the patent owner moves to amend its claims under 35 U.S.C. §
316(d), may the PTO require the patent owner to bear the burden of
persuasion, or a burden of production, regarding patentability of the
amended claims as a condition of allowing them? Which burdens are
permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)?
(b) When the petitioner does not challenge the patentability of a proposed
amended claim, or the Board thinks the challenge is inadequate, may the
Board sua sponte raise patentability challenges to such a claim? If so, where
would the burden of persuasion, or a burden of production, lie?
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The court is also rehearing en banc Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom
Corp.222 and will address whether the court has the power to review
the USPTO’s determinations of timeliness in IPR proceedings.223
If the court does reject the USPTO’s amendment rules or
empowers itself to review issues of timeliness, these decisions will be
the court’s first significant interventions with the USPTO’s
regulations post-AIA, demonstrating that the Federal Circuit may be
ready to challenge the USPTO’s dominance in this area. Such
interventions likely will trigger Supreme Court review. As such, the
relationships among the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and the
USPTO are likely to continue to evolve.

Aqua Prods., 833 F.3d at 1336.
222. 837 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated by, and rehearing en banc granted, Nos.
2015-1944, 2015-1945, 2015-1946, 2017 WL 957224, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2017).
223. The specific question presented is,
Should this court overrule Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803
F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and hold that judicial review is available for a
patent owner to challenge the PTO’s determination that the petitioner
satisfied the timeliness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) governing the
filing of petitions for inter partes review?
Wi-Fi One, 2017 WL 957224, at *1.

